
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75-647

DAVID J. K. GRANFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT**

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PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
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The petitioner, David J. K. Granfield, respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entered in this proceeding on January 29, 1976.

OPINION AND ORDERS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, not yet reported, appears in Appendix "A" hereto. The

judgment of that Court is attached as Appendix "A-1". The opinion of the District Court for the District of Columbia, dated October 17, 1973, is reported at 365 F. Supp. 147 (D.D.C. 1973), and is appended hereto as Appendix "B". The judgment of the District Court is attached as Appendix "B-1".

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was entered on January 29, 1976. An application for extension of time in which to file petition for writ of certiorari to and including May 12, 1976 was filed with this Court on April 16, 1976 and granted per order of the Chief Justice on April 19, 1976. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a church-related institution of higher education may elect to expend federal funds received by it by virtue of Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), in a manner deliberately calculated to advance the purely ecclesiastical objectives of the church to which it is related, or whether, to the contrary, public monies received by a church-

related institution are impressed with a trust requiring that decisions as to the use and distribution of such funds be based exclusively on criteria which are secular, neutral and nonideological?

2. Whether a federal court should refrain, as a matter of policy, from scrutinizing against the standards of the Establishment Clause the manner in which a church-related institution expends federal funds, where that institution claims that its decision as to the expenditure of funds received is based on ecclesiastical considerations internal to the church to which it is related?
3. Whether a faculty member at a church-related institution suffering direct injury in fact as the result of a suspect expenditure of federal funds by the church-related institution is barred from challenging the constitutionality of that pattern of spending because (a) in his religious life he is a member of an order in the church to which the institution is related, and (b) he seeks relief only as to the challenged pattern of distribution which actually injures him without challenging the

entire flow of federal funds to the institution.

4. Whether a church-related institution of higher education may elect to use and distribute federal funds received by it in a manner so as to place a tax or burden on the religious free exercise rights of persons within its ambit of governance, or whether the election to make such a free exercise-invading distribution, because of the federal source of funds, is imputable to the Federal Government, and enjoined in a federal court.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions involved are Article III, Section 2, and the First and Fifth Amendments, United States Constitution.

"Section 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . ;- to controversies . . . between . . . citizens of different States . . ."

U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2.

"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, . . ."

U.S. Constitution, Amendment I.

"No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; . . ."

U.S. Constitution, Amendment V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner is a tenured professor at respondent Catholic University of America's law school. In addition, in his religious life, petitioner is a priest and a member of the Benedictine Order in the Roman Catholic Church. Because of petitioner's religious status, respondent discounts his salary pursuant to a special pay scale -- the so-called "clerical scale" -- maintained by respondent for faculty members who are Roman Catholic priests or members of Roman Catholic religious orders. This discount is applied to petitioner's salary in spite of the fact that his teaching duties as a law professor are unrelated to his choice to be and remain a priest, and in spite of the fact that he has never volunteered to give up any portion of his salary. On the basis of respondent's clerical scale petitioner was receiving at the time this suit was filed only approximately 50% of the salary paid other tenured full professors at respondent's law school, and still receives very substantially less than his peers at the law school solely because of his choice, in his religious life, to be a priest and a

member of a religious order. Respondent concedes, and the Court of Appeals specifically recognized, that the clerical scale is maintained solely for religious or ecclesiastical reasons internal to the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, precisely because of this respondent sought to preclude scrutiny of this policy by the counts below.

In the academic year 1969-1970, respondent drew over 25% of its total revenues from United States Government sources. In dollars, this amounted to \$5,385,227 in that year. The proportion of United States Government sources to all sources of revenue has not changed substantially since 1969-70. As explicitly noted by the Court of Appeals, monies received by respondent are treated as unrestricted funds, and a portion of those funds are paid out as faculty salaries.

(A18-19). ^{1/}

^{1/} References to Appendix "A", the Opinion of the Court of Appeals, are indicated by "A" followed by the appropriate page number. References to Appendix "B", the Opinion of the District Court, are indicated by "B" followed by the appropriate page number.

The complaint in this action was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on July 30, 1971.^{2/} The suit was filed after it became apparent that respondent had repudiated a policy initially announced in December 1968 to pay, as soon as possible, clerical faculty members on the same basis as other members of the faculty.

The announcement that respondent would pay "parity" salaries to clerical members of its faculty as soon as possible came at a time when respondent was carrying out a number of fundamental structural changes at the university to dramatically reduce its ties with the Roman Catholic Church. These changes were initiated at least in part to assure respondent's eligibility for federal funds. They resulted in a far more secular, and far less religious, institution. The promise to pay parity salaries to clerical members of the faculty appeared at the time to be a logical part of these changes.

^{2/} Jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. §1332 (diversity jurisdiction - petitioner is a resident of Maryland).

During the two years following the initial announcement of December, 1968 promising the implementation of parity pay for clerical faculty members as soon as possible, respondent through its chief executive and other administrative officers issued reassurances reaffirming the initial promise. However, in December, 1970, following a passionate attack on the parity policy by an influential clerical member of respondent's Board of Trustees, respondent repudiated its previous promises to pay parity salaries to clerical faculty members. The fact that this repudiation had taken place became clear to the University generally during the spring of 1971, and this suit was brought after a proposed near-parity salary for petitioner was rejected by respondent's administration, and replaced by a salary discounted by approximately 50% pursuant to the clerical scale.

The complaint claimed that respondent's announced promise to pay parity salaries to clerical members of the faculty together with the reassurances made by respondent entitled petitioner, as a matter of promissory estoppel, contract, and property right, to declaratory and injunctive relief affirming petitioner's entitlement to a salary

paid on the basis of the same criteria applied to other law professors. Further, petitioner, in the context of his contractual and property rights as a tenured professor, sought to enjoin the discounting of his salary on the basis of the First and Fifth Amendments. By this petition, review is sought only as to the latter claims.^{3/}

After trial the District Court issued a memorandum opinion on October 18, 1973 pursuant to which judgment was entered for defendant - respondent on October 21, 1973. (See Appendices B and B-1). The Appeal was argued on November 27, 1974, and an opinion and judgment affirming the District Court was entered on January 29, 1976. (See Appendices A and A-1).

Citing the "case or controversy" requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner's First Amendment claims are nonjusticiable. In a step

^{3/} This case was consolidated by the District Court with Joseph A. Broderick v. Catholic University of America, and on appeal also was consolidated with that case. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed in this Court on behalf of Joseph A. Broderick on April 28, 1976. No. 75-1577

having critical significance for future enforcement of Establishment Clause standards, the Court of Appeals concluded that, to be justiciable, an Establishment Clause claim must attack the legality of government grants per se -- that the sine qua non of justiciability is wholehearted contrariety between the parties on the legitimacy of all public funds granted to the institution. Noting that petitioner sought relief only as to a pattern of spending which actually injured him, without seeking the drastic cut-off relief said to be essential, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was without standing to rely even in part on the Establishment Clause.

Yet the Court of Appeals recognized that "Appellants make the record crystal clear that the moneys received by the University from the government . . . find their way into faculty salaries." (A-18 - 19). And the Court also recognized that an "important constitutional issue is presented". However, "sound principles of judicial restraint" were invoked as a basis for leaving untouched this obvious use of public funds for a religious purpose. In addition, petitioner's claim that his free exercise rights have been

violated was rejected by the Court with the observation that:

"The appellants' reduced salaries were set by an arm of their own religious organization, for the advancement of its own ecclesiastical objectives. Under these circumstances, a conclusion that appellant's Free Exercise rights were somehow violated by the government would be a paralogism." (A-25).

With this the Court of Appeals closes its eyes to the obvious paradox of calling a federally-funded institution an "arm" of a "religious organization", and openly condones the distribution of public funds within that institution for the "advancement" of a religious organization's "ecclesiastical objectives".

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents a cluster of interrelated issues which need to be resolved by this Court. At stake in resolution of the threshold issue of justiciability is effective enforcement of Establishment Clause standards as to church-related institutions of higher education receiving public funds by virtue of Tilton v. Richardson, supra. The holding of the Court of Appeals denying justiciability effectively blocks a critically important

avenue of Establishment Clause enforcement by precluding persons bearing an internal relationship to a church-related university -- faculty members or students -- from challenging that institution's use of public funds for religious purposes. Also in issue is whether respondent and other publicly-funded church-related universities can shield from First Amendment scrutiny their expenditure of public funds by claiming that such expenditure was made on the basis of religious considerations -- whether such an institution has a free exercise right, immune from judicial examination, to expend public funds for religious purposes, and in doing so place burdens on the religious free exercise rights of its faculty members. These and the other issues set out above present pivotally important questions of federal law which have not been, but should be, settled by the Court.

1. The holding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner could not present a justiciable claim under the First Amendment effectively frustrates any meaningful enforcement of Establishment Clause standards as to publicly-funded church-related institutions of higher education.

The effect of the Court of Appeals justiciability holding on enforcement of Establishment

Clause standards demonstrates the need for granting the writ. Two factors are identified by the Court of Appeals as bearing on its decision not to adjudicate the concededly important constitutional issue presented by this case: (a) the fact that petitioner is a co-religionist with respondent undermines the contrariety between the parties as to the legitimacy per se of government grants to the University, and (b), to embark on resolution of the issue presented would involve the Court in deciding an internal religious or theological question.

Even superficial analysis of these reasons illustrates the adverse impact of the holding on Establishment Clause enforcement.

The first point goes to the basic "case or controversy" requirement of Article III, Section 2. Yet, in fact, any lack of contrariety between the parties, as to the legitimacy per se of government grants to respondent, simply is not pertinent to this suit. Petitioner did not, and need not have, attacked the legitimacy of public grants per se to respondent. Certainly, under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 186 (1968), petitioner as a federal taxpayer has standing to seek relief against

government grants per se to the University. However, this was not his purpose. Because as a faculty member he bore an internal relationship to respondent, as opposed to the external relationship of the typical taxpayer challenger, it was plainly not in his interest to seek a total cut-off of funds to his employer. It was entirely legitimate for him to address a particular pattern of distributing public monies received where that pattern caused him direct injury: economic injury by cutting his salary in half, and the far greater injury of taxing his religious free exercise rights.

Significantly, the Court of Appeals found no want of contrariety between the parties as to the legality, in a First Amendment context, of the clerical scale. And given that concrete adverseness, the Court of Appeals acting pursuant to its broad equity powers should have fashioned a decree to fit the necessities of the case. Its power to have done so is beyond question. Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-330 (1940). See Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). By electing not to even recognize its traditional equity power, and by requiring as a threshold matter of justiciability a draconian

prayer for the cut-off of all public revenues, the Court of Appeals forecloses any individual bearing an internal relationship to a church-related institution from acting to police that institution's expenditure of public funds; as with petitioner, the self-interest of a faculty member or student almost invariably will dictate a posture which permits the continuation of such funds. But this does not preclude an individual bearing an internal relationship to an institution from having a concrete adverse interest opposed to a particular religiously-motivated expenditure of public monies, and seeking relief as to that expenditure.

This drastic pruning of the class of persons able to act as watchdogs to enforce the requirements of the Establishment Clause is furthered by the Court of Appeal's denial of petitioner's standing because of his status as a co-religionist with the church to which respondent is related. Yet obviously an individual bearing an internal relationship to a church-related institution is apt to be a member of the church to which the institution is connected. As noted by the Chief Justice in Tilton v. Richardson, supra, 403 U.S. at 686, the faculties and student bodies at the four Roman

Catholic Church-related institutions of higher education there involved were predominantly Catholic. This is not atypical.

This narrowing of the class of persons able to enforce Establishment Clause standards comes just at a time when that class plainly must be broadened. Following Tilton v. Richardson, supra, large numbers of church-related institutions of higher education began to receive public monies. Plainly the traditional "watchdog" groups which have made broad general challenges to programs involving the use of public funds for religious purposes have neither the time nor resources to police the myriad number of church-related institutions now receiving public aid. These traditional watchdogs -- the taxpayer plaintiffs suing under Flast v. Cohen, supra -- because they bear an external relationship to the institution, invariably seek a total cut-off of all public funds. But their obvious inability to police individual institutions requires this Court to look elsewhere for individuals able to enforce Establishment Clause norms as to individual church-related universities or colleges. The Court must look to those bearing an internal relationship to the institution, to

faculty members or students, if Establishment Clause standards are to be enforced.^{4/} And to assure that enforcement of First Amendment standards is not severely bridled, the Court should grant the writ.

Equally sure to bridle enforcement of Establishment Clause standards is the Court's second basis for denying justiciability: that to embark on resolution of the issue presented in this case is to resolve an internal religious or theological question.

This second basis for restraint, of course, itself rests on Establishment Clause considerations. See Opinion of the Court of Appeals at 24 (A-24). Because, then, the Establishment Clause itself is being raised as a shield against an Establishment Clause challenge to a suspect use of

^{4/} This is especially so in light of the position taken by the U.S. Office of Education that Section 432 of the General Education Provision Act, 20 U.S.C. §1232a, precludes enforcement of Establishment Clause norms by that office as to church-related grantees of federal funds. See Appendix 'E' to Petition for Certiorari filed in Joseph A. Broderick v. Catholic University of America, No. 75-1577.

public funds, this ground for finding a lack of justiciability must be examined with special care.^{5/} For, ironically, the logic of the view of the Court of Appeals is to immunize any particular expenditure or pattern of expenditure of public funds from Establishment Clause challenge where a religious reason for that expenditure can be cited by the church-related institution.

This alone should make this Court wary of the approach taken by the Court of Appeals. But, in addition, in this case there is in fact no clash between opposing imperatives of the Establishment Clause. Petitioner's challenge of the clerical scale on a First Amendment basis does not involve the Court in adjudicating religious, theological or ecclesiastical issues. In contrast to, for instance, Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial

^{5/} Besides resting on Establishment Clause considerations, the Court of Appeals in citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952) (See Opinion at 24 (A-24)), seems to assume that respondent has a free exercise right as a religious organization to expend public monies for the advancement of religious or ecclesiastical objectives.

Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), where resolution of the case required a determination as to whether the Presbyterian Church had abandoned its theological principles, here resolution of the challenge to the clerical scale puts in issue only the nature of the objectives underlying that scale: either the scale is maintained exclusively for secular, neutral and nonideological purposes, or it is maintained for religious, theological or ecclesiastical purposes. If the purposes of the scale are found to be religious, theological or ecclesiastical, the inquiry ends there -- public funds cannot be distributed to advance religious objectives. Certainly no need exists to address the theological or religious merits of the scale. To say that this inquiry, strictly as to the nature of the underlying objectives, involves the Court in resolving an internal religious issue as in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Church, supra, blocks enforcement of Establishment Clause norms as to church-related institutions receiving public funds, because, inevitably, a religious purpose is the most obvious grounds for such a challenge. If a religious purpose, besides being the basis of the challenge, also

constitutes a complete defense to the challenge, the Establishment Clause is reduced to a nullity.

Again, because of the obvious importance of this issue and the need for definitive guidance from this Court, the writ should be granted.

2. The holding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner could not present a justiciable claim under the Establishment Clause is in conflict with principles consistently applied by this Court in decisions dealing with justiciability and standing.
-

In the holding of the Court of Appeals on justiciability we see a curious, indeed bizarre, perversion of basic concepts of justiciability and standing. The Court denies petitioner standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim, in spite of the fact that he has been personally injured, both in economic terms and by a tangible and readily identifiable invasion of his free exercise rights -- petitioner is denied standing even though he has all the qualities of the traditional plaintiff. Yet the Court of Appeals is plainly willing to hear an Establishment Clause challenge relating to the same suspect use of public funds from a taxpayer plaintiff who, in reality, has an interest

indistinguishable from that of any other citizen. ^{6/}
This holding cannot be squared with the principles consistently applied by this Court. It is especially at odds with recent decisions of this Court emphasizing that plaintiffs, to have standing, must show an actual or threatened injury. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974); Linda R.A. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973). This conflict constitutes an added reason why the writ should be granted.

3. The holding of the Court of Appeals extends to publicly-funded church-related institutions the free exercise rights of religious organizations at the direct derogation of individual free exercise rights.
-

The recently sanctioned flow of public money to church-related institutions of higher education gives rise to a number of issues which are of great importance because of the constitutional

^{6/} Indeed, it is implicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals that if petitioner brought suit on the basis of his status as a federal taxpayer, and asked for a total cut-off of funds, that the Court of Appeals would have recognized his standing qua taxpayer -- yet the Court rejects his ability to bring a justiciable claim based on his direct economic injury and the invasion of his free exercise right.

prohibitions applicable. The writ should be granted because the path pioneered by the Court of Appeals puts those constitutional prohibitions in jeopardy. The Court below adopts the claim of respondent that it has a free exercise right to expend public money for religious purposes, and in doing so, not only defeats the Establishment Clause prohibition, but also defeats petitioner's free exercise rights to practice his religion free from the imposition of a tax or penalty on his religious choices.

The Court of Appeals, without explicitly saying so, invested respondent with the special free exercise rights of an organized church -- those rights recognized by this Court in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952). Referring to Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 679 (1872), the Kedroff opinion observes:

The opinion radiates, . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation -- in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. (Emphasis added.)

In concluding that respondent is an "arm" of a "religious organization", the Court of Appeals

plainly endows respondent with Kedroff-type free exercise rights, and uses that endowment to defeat petitioner's Establishment Clause challenge, and perhaps still more critically, his free exercise claim. ^{7/} Because the direction embarked upon

^{7/} The conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals seems in nearly willful disregard of the record in this case. The structural changes initiated by respondent between 1968 and 1970, in part to assure its eligibility for federal funds, in fact very fundamentally changed the character of the University, from being a religious institution to being a primarily secular one. As noted by the District Court, "but for a few remaining vestiges [The clerical scale being one], the Catholic University functions essentially as most other American institutions of higher education". (B-2). In the face of this, the conclusion that respondent is a "religious organization" seems especially strained, and the implicit holding that respondent simply could not violate petitioner's free exercise rights is plainly in error. Functionally, except for formal ties, respondent is in most regards a secular institution. And certainly from a petitioner's visceral standpoint, the maintenance of a special low scale for clergy by this primarily secular institution is a direct and coercive intermeddling with his religious life. As time goes on, and the original ecclesiastical reason for maintaining the clerical scale fades, and the direct monetary savings enjoyed by respondent by virtue of the

by the Court of Appeals does such fundamental violence to the constitutional imperatives embodied in both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, this Court should grant the writ and provide guidance to the lower federal courts on this important issue.

4. This Court needs to decide whether a substantial infusion of federal money into the general funds of a church-related university makes the expenditure of that money, in a manner so as to invade the free exercise rights of individuals within the university, attributable to the federal government.

Because the "state action" doctrine developed by this Court starting with the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), is based on the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment, that doctrine is not directly relevant to a claim based on the Religion Clause of the First Amendment. Plainly, however, a free exercise violation by a federally-funded institution is, under some circumstances, attributable to the federal government. This case clearly focuses on just when such an attribution should be made.

7/ (Cont'd)

scale becomes the dominant motivation for its maintenance, recognition of petitioner's free exercise claim becomes increasingly urgent.

The issue is an important one, and this Court should grant the writ in order to define the relevant standard of attribution.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons aforesaid, it is respectfully prayed that a writ of certiorari be granted to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX A

A1
APPENDIX A

**Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia dated January 29, 1976**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT

No. 74-1151

DAVID J. K. GRANFIELD, APPELLANT

v.

**THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORPORATION**

No. 74-1152

JOSEPH A. BRODERICK, APPELLANT

v.

**THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORPORATION**

**Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia**

(Civil Actions 1534-71 & 1535-71)

Argued November 27, 1974

Decided January 29, 1976

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Appendix A

Benjamin P. Lamberton, for appellant in No. 74-1151.

Samuel J. Murray, for appellant in No. 74-1152. *William R. Joyce, Jr.*, was on the brief for appellant in No. 74-1152.

Alfred L. Scanlan, with whom *James R. Bieke*, *Stephen A. Trimble* and *Nicholas D. Ward*, were on the brief for appellee.

Before: BAZELON, *Chief Judge*, LEVENTHAL, *Circuit Judge* and JUSTICE,* *United States District Judge* for the Eastern District of Texas.

Opinion for the Court filed by *District Judge* JUSTICE.

JUSTICE, *District Judge*:

INTRODUCTION:

The Catholic University of America is a private educational institution located in Washington, D.C.¹ Historically, the University has maintained a disparity between the salaries which it has paid its lay faculty members and those paid to clerical faculty members.² According to the appellee, this lower salary scale or "clerical

* Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (d)

¹ The relationship between Catholic University and the Catholic Church is discussed in the section of this memorandum which concerns the appellants' constitutional claims. See n. 19, *supra*.

² The clerical pay scale is approximately 65% of the comparable "lay scale". However, since the lay salary scale at the University's law school is significantly higher and there is an \$11,000 salary limit for clerics, the percentage is lower in the law school. Appellant Granfield, for example, receives a salary which is approximately 50% of the median salary paid to other full professors at the Law School. The clerical scale was applied, without exception prior to 1970, to all priests on the faculty, whether or not they took vows of poverty or were subject to federal taxation.

Appendix A

discount" is a form of financial support for the University deliberately chosen by the Catholic Bishops.³ It is the application of the clerical discount to their salaries which appellants attack in this civil action, both on constitutional and on contractual grounds. Prior to consideration of the appellant's first amendment contentions, we must assess the contractual claims of the priests in order to avoid, if possible, resolution of the controversy on constitutional grounds. *See, e.g., Ashwander v. Valley Authority*, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347, 56 S.Ct. 466, ———, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (concurring opinion of Brandeis, J.).

Appellant David J. K. Granfield is a tenured professor of law at the University's Columbus School of Law, having been a member of the law school faculty since 1960. Granfield is a Roman Catholic priest and a member of the Benedictine Order. Appellant Joseph A. Broderick is also a tenured professor at the law school; he has been on the faculty since 1963, achieving tenure in 1969. Broderick is a priest in the Order of Preachers (Dominicans).

THE CONTRACTUAL ISSUES

Faculty Contracts

At Catholic University, the deans of the various schools are appointed by the President. The Dean of the Law School has authority to prepare a proposed budget for

³ The clerical discount is said to prevent competition for financial reasons among the diocesan clergy for appointments to the University and to deter faculty from declining to return to religious and charitable work in their home dioceses if needed. The Bishops, in choosing to promulgate the clerical discount, are apparently in accord with a tradition whereby church-related colleges have expected some measure of sacrifice from members of their faculty. Such sacrifices, it is stated, help to permit the University to grant tuition discounts to clerical students, and to students preparing for the priesthood.

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Appendix A

his school and to make recommendations concerning faculty salaries. The Executive Vice-President and Provost of the University must approve the proposed budget for the Law School; while this approval is not final, it provides a basis under which the Dean can make plans for the forthcoming academic year. Final authority over the budget resides in the Board of Trustees.

There are no formal written agreements between the University and the faculty members as to terms of employment. Official notification setting forth the terms of employment is by "letter of appointment."⁴ Both appellants testified at the trial that they received letters of appointment at the beginning of each academic year in which there was some change in their rank or salary.

Sequence of Events Relevant to Claims of Both Appellants

As early as 1945, the University's Board of Trustees considered implementing a policy of salary parity between lay and clerical faculty. However, it was not until 1968 that efforts to achieve full parity appeared to come near realization. Against a background of "institutional declericalization",⁵ the priest-professors at Catholic University had accelerated their agitation for salary equalization. The Board of Trustees was aware that, if parity was not to be adopted, a number of clerical faculty mem-

⁴ The appointment letter is "the equivalent of an employment contract." *Board of Regents v. Roth*, 408 U.S. 564, 566, n. 1, 92 S.Ct. 2701, ———, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

⁵ During 1967-70 the University, which once functioned under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church, severed many of its ties with the Church. Only three schools now have "pontifical status"—these being the schools of Theology, Philosophy, and Canon Law. In 1969 a layman became president of the University. In addition, the student body and faculty, which were once nearly exclusively Catholic, gained significantly in non-Catholic percentage.

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bers planned to leave the University to obtain full salaries elsewhere.⁶ The faculty pressure culminated on February 8, 1968, when the Academic Senate⁷ adopted a resolution requesting the Board of Trustees to institute a policy of parity and to "implement this policy without delay". Then, on September 12, 1968, the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees reported that it "favored putting the salaries of clerical members of the faculty on a parity with lay members." At a meeting of the Board of Trustees on December 6-7, 1968, the Finance Committee, along with the Committee on Academic Affairs, resolved

to go on record as still considering the desired goal in faculty salaries to be the A level of the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] scale—not Plan A—including, *eventually*, placing the salaries of clerical members of the faculty on a parity with lay teachers. (*Italics added.*)

The minutes of this meeting show a notation immediately following the above resolution:

The Committees, however, faced the straitened 1969-1970 financial situation. Its realities make it impossible to implement Plan B as submitted by the Academic Senate.

⁶ Bishop McDonald reported to the trustees that:

There is a short supply of good teachers, and a highly competitive market with a rapidly growing student body. Secular as well as Catholic colleges and universities are willing to bid for qualified Catholic teachers, including priests. The situation has become critical and even desperate. (Minutes, Board of Trustees Meeting, April 28, 1965.)

⁷ The Academic Senate is responsible for the academic governance of the University. The body is composed of members of the faculty, including the president of the University, deans and faculty representatives.

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At this meeting, the formal recommendation of the Committees was to retain the salary scale then in effect, using available funds for new personnel and merit increments for the faculty. This recommendation was approved by the Board of Trustees.

On December 12, 1968, Acting President Nivard Scheel reported to the Academic Senate that the Board of Trustees, at the December 6-7 meeting, had

approved a recommendation submitted jointly by its Committees on Academic Affairs and Finance that the AAUP "A" scale, and *parity of clerical and lay salaries be achieved as soon as possible*. However, because of limited revenues, "Plan B" cannot be achieved next year. Income from the rise in tuition will therefore be used to (a) maintain present salary scale, (b) permit recruitment of new administrative and faculty personnel, and (c) allow for merit increases to selected members of the faculty. (Italics added.)

This announcement by Acting President Scheel is at the heart of appellants' contention that the University promised adoption of a parity salary scale or made representations upon which they reasonably and detrimentally relied. On two subsequent occasions, Scheel addressed faculty meetings, expressing his understanding that parity had been accepted by the trustees in principle, and that implementation of the policy was a matter of immediate priority. Other members of the administration also believed that the Board of Trustees had adopted the principle of parity. Scheel's successor, President Walton, told a meeting of clerical faculty members that:

The University *aims* to raise their salaries to parity: to 75% of parity in 1971-72; 85% in 1972-73; and 100% in 1973-74. (Italics added.)

This representation is reflected in the minutes of the June 6, 1970, Board of Trustees meeting. On November

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23, 1970, President Walton, writing to two priest faculty members of a committee the trustees had appointed to review the parity issue, repeated the foregoing schedule and stated:

Since the principle of parity has been accepted by the Board I do not believe that the Board intends to repudiate that principle.

The move toward parity ended abruptly on December 12, 1970, when, spurred by an influential trustee, the Board passed a "just compensation" resolution, which appellants characterize as, and appellee concedes was, a clear repudiation of parity as an official University policy.

Interpretation of the action taken by the Board of Trustees at the December 6-7, 1968, meeting is of great significance in evaluating appellant's claims. Clearly, Acting President Scheel and other administrators believed the University had committed itself to institute a parity salary scale, when feasible. The Administrative Bulletin is a publication compiled by the University's Office of the Provost, and is a general source of information for the University community. Its December 16, 1968, issue reported the following as to the Board's action at the December 6-7 meeting:

After consideration of faculty salary proposals presented at a previous meeting, the Board (1) affirmed acceptance as a *goal* of the A-level standard of the American Association of University Professors and elimination of the present disparity between scales for clerical and religious and for lay members of the faculty; (2) directed that normal salary increments under the present scale should be continued during 1969-70; and (3) directed that, after such increments, funds remaining from increased tuition income should be used for salaries of new administrative and faculty personnel and for merit increments to present members of the faculty. (*Italics added.*)

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Based upon the announcements and representations of University officials mentioned above, both appellants contend, *inter alia*, that Catholic University should be estopped from denying that the clerical scale would no longer be applicable in determining their salaries. Appellants also contend they should be found to have enforceable contracts which provide for salaries unaffected by the "clerical discount."

APPELLANT GRANFIELD

This district court was of the opinion that Father Granfield's strongest claim was based upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The elements of the promissory estoppel doctrine are authoritatively set forth in the Restatement, Contracts § 90 (1932):

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.⁸

The Restatement formulation has been applied by this court. *See, e.g., N. Lotterio & Co. v. Glassman Construction Co.*, 115 U.S.App. D.C. 335, 319 F.2d 736 (1963).

The promissory estoppel doctrine of the Restatement would seem to erect four conceptual hurdles for appellant Granfield. First, did the statements of the University officials constitute a promise? If so, should the University have expected that appellant would rely on the announce-

⁸ The Restatement 2d of Contracts (Tent. Draft #2) provides:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

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ments, and "act" or "forbear" action of a definite and substantial nature? The next inquiry is whether the appellant actually relied on the promise to his detriment; that is, did he choose to remain at Catholic University instead of accepting opportunities elsewhere in reliance on the representation that he and the other clerics would receive a "parity" salary? Finally, the court must ask whether injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.

The district court found that Father Granfield could not reasonably have relied on the "amorphous statements" issued by the University as to parity. For example, the court noted that the Board of Trustees' Finance Committee report of December 6-7, 1968, spoke of parity as a desired *goal*. Acting President Scheel, on December 12, 1968, stated that the Board had approved a recommendation that parity be achieved *as soon as possible*. And on June 6, 1970, the Board was informed that President Walton had told the clerical faculty that the University *aims* to raise their salaries according to the reported timetable. The court rejected even the most definite statement made by President Walton as a sufficient basis for promissory estoppel,⁹ viewing it as being limited to an expression of intentions rather than explicit promises, to be evaluated against a background of precatory statements concerning parity.

Although we may not have reached that result had this question come before us *de novo*,¹⁰ we do not consider the

⁹ See quotation *supra* at p. 6.

¹⁰ The court's finding on the making of a promise is subject to review under the clearly erroneous standard. Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. The question for the appellate court under Rule 52(a) is not whether it would have made the same findings as did the trial court, but whether the appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. *Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine*, 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89

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district court's decision as clearly erroneous. As the district court found, "the statements issued by the University as to parity were often confusing and possibly contradictory." Its ruling that Father Granfield could not justifiably rely on these confusing statements subsumes a finding that no "promise" was ever made by appellee on which Granfield could rely; one of the elements of a "promise" is that it be "communicated in such a manner to a promisee that he may justly expect performance and may reasonably rely thereon."¹¹ Such a holding is not clearly wrong in the institutional context of this case. The University is not a commercial seller promising immediate delivery as soon as a specific missing part becomes available. The quality of indefiniteness in the institutional context is underlined by the statement of Acting President Nivard Scheel that parity will be achieved as soon as possible but not next year,¹² since the Board of Trustees' judgment had been that the parity goal could give way to other expenditure priorities considered more pressing. The University's undertaking on parity thus is accompanied by a reservation for determination of when parity would be reasonable in its institutional circumstances.¹³ The district court found that this

S.Ct. 1562, ———, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969); see also *United States v. United States Gypsum Co.*, 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, ———, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).

¹¹ Corbin defines "promise" as "an expression of intention that the promisor will conduct himself in a specified way or bring about a specified result in the future, communicated in such a manner to a promisee that he may justly expect performance and may reasonably rely thereon." 1 *Corbin on Contracts* § 13 (1963).

¹² See discussion *supra*, at p. 6.

¹³ Cf. 1 *Williston on Contracts* § 40 (3d Ed. 1957):

A promise is not too indefinite for enforcement because of the use of such inexact words of definition of the time of performance as "immediately" [or] "as soon as possi-

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undertaking lacked the specificity necessary for a promisee to justly expect and reasonably rely on performance, whether or not appellant relied in fact.¹⁴

It may well be that the district court was influenced in reaching its result of no promise generating justifiable reliance by its equitable obligation not to give effect to reliance unless necessary to avoid injustice. Equitable considerations properly include evaluation of the formality of the promise, whether there is a commercial setting and its nature, and whether there is unjust enrichment.¹⁵ The plaintiffs could reasonably have expected change as a probability without thereby becoming justified in the kind of monetary outlay or equivalent reliance that generates contractual remedy. We are not persuaded that the district court has wrought injustice. Nor is there merit in the other theories advanced by appellant as regards his contractual or entitlement claims.

ble" . . . since the general interpretation of such stipulation is, as quickly as is reasonable under the circumstances.

¹⁴ The court also found that appellant Granfield did not demonstrate detrimental reliance of a definite and substantial nature. We are not required to review that finding.

¹⁵ The Restatement of Contracts § 90, Comment (b) provides that:

The promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, or the formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent, and channeling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as enforcement of bargains and prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant.

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APPELLANT BRODERICK

In addition to the arguments advanced by Father Granfield, appellant Broderick sets forth certain relevant circumstances in support of his claims. Broderick was granted sabbatical leave for the academic year 1969-1970, and spent much of the period between January and June 1970 in Europe. While there, he corresponded with Clinton Bamberger, Dean of the Law School. It is evident from this correspondence that Father Broderick was seriously considering resignation. As the following recitation of their correspondence will manifest, Broderick was granted a salary increase and did return to the University.

Father Broderick argues that he reasonably interpreted the increase as an agreement to remove him from any clerical salary scale. The court below found otherwise; it was the court's conclusion that Broderick was promised only a salary increase—not a change of status, removing him from the clerical scale. The first relevant letter was written by Broderick on January 25, 1970. Dean Bamberger had requested the professor's comments in regard to the proposed budget, which scheduled the appellant's salary at \$11,000. Broderick's response evidenced his displeasure with the proposed salary and stated, among other things, that he would prefer to preach, write, or teach theology or philosophy rather than teaching law under "second class citizen" conditions.

Dean Bamberger responded on January 29, 1970. He wrote:

\$11,000 is the maximum paid to University clerics under University policy. If I was not bound by that policy I would have recommended for you a salary of \$21,500. That is the step at which you would be in the scale which I constructed to give me some rough guidance.

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Bamberger further stated that he considered Broderick to be the very best professor at the law school, and that he wanted to do what he could to retain his services there. He concluded his letter with these comments:

If what you are saying is that you are not willing to accept the reduced salary, then I am sorely distressed because you will force me to accept your loss for ours which I cannot control. I will stand behind you 100% in any forum in which you want to raise the issue of parity for clerics. I do not know what else I can do.

Broderick responded on March 27, 1970. Again he intimated that it was likely that he would not return to the University. He added:

Furthermore, while I think the University's position on clerical salaries is vicious and demeaning to an educational institution—aside from its raw injustice—they do not need to change all that at once to meet my problem . . . No priest should be teaching at the non-Pontifical schools without being paid the same as any other human being there.

Broderick again wrote to Dean Bamberger on April 22, 1970. In this letter, Father Broderick reminded Bamberger that he had "told [him] over a year ago that the only reason [he] would leave C.U. would be a failure to come up with equalization." He spoke of being faced with "a serious moral decision."

The correspondence of greatest significance to appellant's promissory estoppel and contract claims was sent to Broderick by Bamberger on April 24, 1970. Stating that he was writing without taking time to review the correspondence and answer the points raised by appellant, Bamberger represented the following:

. . . I have just firmed up your salary for next year and want to get the news to you as soon as possible. The salary for next year for you will be \$20,100—*with no clerical discount.* (Italics added.)

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Father Broderick argues that he interpreted—and in light of the preceding correspondence, was entitled to interpret—this representation as an agreement by the University to grant him parity, contending that it was plain from the language and tone of his letters that nothing less than parity would satisfy him and induce him to return. However, the trial court found that (a) the April 24th letter promised a salary increase, not a removal from the clerical scale; and (b) that Father Broderick could not have justifiably relied on the letter as a promise of parity. Further, the court, without making a specific finding on the issue, pointed out that it was doubtful that Dean Bamberger, or Provost Nuesse, had the authority to remove appellant from the clerical scale.

It appears completely understandable that appellant Broderick believed he had been granted parity; he had clearly expressed his moral objections to unequal treatment for priest-professors, and the April 24 letter stated that no clerical discount would be applied to his salary for the forthcoming academic year. However, certain of the appellant's earlier statements intimated that he might return to the University if steps were taken short of abolishment of the clerical scale.¹⁶ In light of these

¹⁶ On one occasion, Father Broderick wrote to Dean Bamberger: "The double-talk from the University is just too much. I would almost be prepared to stay if Nuesse or Walton would sign his name to a paper (to you or me) that no cleric at the University is getting the magic ceiling mentioned by you. It just isn't true and they know it." In another communication, related earlier, wherein Father Broderick decried the injustice of the clerical discount, he commented: "... they do not have to change all that at once to meet my problem." In this same letter, Broderick added that if he returned under unchanged circumstances he would be personally committed to (a) working under protest, claiming he was legally entitled to full compensation; and (b) commencing action within the American Association of University Professors to force defendant to pay full compensation or be discredited.

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intimations, the University could have concluded that a compromise, in the form of a salary increase, might induce the appellant to return to his teaching position and fight for the policy he abhorred from within. In any event, Dean Bamberger's letter is subject to the interpretation that the University was offering only a salary increase for the next academic year.¹⁷ The trial court found that this was the case, and that appellee had no promise of parity.¹⁸ Hence, the court rejected both the contract and promissory estoppel claims of appellant, and we conclude that the finding upon which the court's holding was based is not clearly erroneous.

FIRST AMENDMENT CONTENTIONS

Appellants Broderick and Granfield have fashioned arguments under the Religion Clauses of the first amendment by which they seek to have the court enjoin the operation of the clerical discount at Catholic University, whose status as a sectarian institution is unquestioned.¹⁹

¹⁷ The district court noted that his salary increase (to \$20,100) was not the amount he had been informed he would be entitled to under a parity scale (\$21,500). Also, the court emphasized that appellant, in his letter to Dean Bamberger of January 25, 1970, stated that he was waiting for final word "as to what my *salary* for 1970-71" will be. (*Italics added.*)

¹⁸ The University has apparently chosen to freeze appellant Broderick's salary at the increased level.

¹⁹ Until February 6, 1970, the University was governed by statutes, under which the University was strictly a pontifical institution, functioning under the direction of the Holy See. Thus, until 1968, the selection of the president of the University was subject to the approval of the Vatican, and all but a few of the University's Board of Trustees were members of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

In 1970, the statutes of the University were superseded with approval of the Holy See, by new by-laws. The Board

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In many respects, the arguments rely on the inter-relationship of the Religion Clauses.²⁰ For purposes of analysis, however, the contentions will be scrutinized separately.

of Trustees now consists of 30 persons, 15 of whom are clerics, including five Cardinals. The local Ordinary, that is, the Archbishop of Washington, is *ex officio* the Chancellor of the University. As previously mentioned, three schools remain under pontifical direction: the Schools of Theology, Philosophy and Canon Law.

The University derives approximately forty-three percent of its income from student and tuition fees. Approximately twenty percent of annual revenue comes from gifts and grants—primarily acquired through diocesan collections conducted by Catholic bishops. Much of the remaining funding is derived from governmental sources.

The involvement and influence of the Catholic Church at Catholic University is obvious; in light of the above factors, we feel completely justified in characterizing Catholic University as a sectarian institution.

Moreover, all parties to this appeal point up the sectarian character of the University—though for different reasons. Appellants argue, *inter alia*, that the government's partial funding of the University, as a church-related institution, amounts to the establishment of a religion—but only for so long as the University allegedly penalizes appellants' free exercise of religion *qua* priests by reducing their salaries *qua* professors. The University contends, as appellee, that none of the governmental aid is in violation of the establishment Clause; that by reason of the University's sectarian nature, any governmental interference with the University's policy of paying its priest-professors at a reduced scale, based on considerations of church policy, would be a violation of the *University's* free exercise rights.

²⁰ The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .

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The Establishment Clause

In suggesting that the government grants to Catholic University violate the Establishment Clause, the appellants present serious allegations of impermissible entanglement between church and state, for the lawful bounds of aid to sectarian institutions are narrowly drawn. See, e.g., *Meek v. Pettinger*, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and cases therein cited. Thoroughly documenting Catholic University's receipt of funds from the Government, and other governmental relationships,²¹ the appellants argue that, *so long as the University subjects its cleric-professors to a discriminatory wage scale*, it violates the mandates of the Establishment Clause.²² Thus, while appellants are willing to construct an argument which includes the Establishment Clause as a constituent element, it is to be noted that they seek only incomplete and transitory enforcement of the prohibitions of the clause. We observe, for example, that no official of the government responsible for the administration of grants to appellee Catholic University has been made a party

²¹ Approximately twenty-five percent of Catholic University's annual income comes from the United States Government, as grants for instruction and research, funds for student aid, interest grants on notes, and reimbursement for indirect notes. Further support for appellants' government action argument is seen in the University's federal tax exemption as an educational institution and its eligibility to receive deductible contributions.

²² The Supreme Court has written much concerning government aid or assistance to parochial and private schools. See generally *Meek v. Pittenger*, *supra*; *Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist*, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); *Levitt v. Committee for Public Education*, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); *Sloan v. Lemon*, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); *Norwood v. Harrison*, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); *Hunt v. McNair*, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); *Tilton v. Richardson*, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); *Everson v. Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

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to the litigation.²³ Neither have the appellants sought a *permanent* injunction directed toward the government or the University, or both, to prohibit continuation of the partial government funding of the institution, although injunctive relief of this type is ordinarily regarded as the appropriate remedy when such aid to a church-related educational body is in issue.²⁴ Moreover, appellants seek a ban against only one specific practice at the University, notwithstanding that other policies pursued by it might be equally suspect under close scrutiny for Establishment Clause transgressions.²⁵

Since it fitted their theory of recovery, appellants did make the record crystal clear that the moneys received by the University from the government are treated as unrestricted funds by the former, thereby demonstrating that some of the government funds find their way

²³ Neither the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare nor the Commissioner of Education was made a party. The Office of Education, created by 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1221 c(a), is, in the statutory language, "the primary agency of the Federal Government responsible for the administration of the programs of financial assistance to educational agencies, institutions and organizations." The Office is "headed by the Commissioner of Education . . . who shall be subject to the direction and supervision of the Secretary [of Health, Education and Welfare]." 20 U.S.C. § 1221c(b). Cf. *Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson*, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968); *Brown v. Christman*, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 203, 126 F.2d 625, 631-632 (1942); *Boles v. Greenville Housing Authority*, 468 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1972).

²⁴ See, e.g., *Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist*, *supra*.

²⁵ Appellants' position that the federal aid runs afoul of the Establishment Clause only while the clerical discount remains in effect ignores the fact that Catholic University would remain a religious institution even if the discount is eliminated, and that the funds in issue are used for purposes other than faculty salaries.

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into faculty salaries. Otherwise, however, they made little effort to disprove that the public grants are being utilized by the University "exclusively for secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes." *Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist*, 413 U.S. at 780. Nor did appellants make manifest whether "an excessive government entanglement with religion" exists, *Walz v. Tax Commission*, 397 U.S. at 675 (1970), or if there is a failure by appellee and government officials "to guarantee the separation between secular and religious functions and to ensure that . . . financial aid supports only the former," *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U.S. at 613. Such a showing would be at the heart of any constitutional violations that might exist.

It is extremely meaningful that the appellants and appellee do not have adverse views as to the propriety of the government grants *per se*. Appellee Catholic University obviously welcomes the aid. The appellants disapprove of the University's receipt of the grants only in the narrow and contingent circumstances presented by their contentions before this court, for their briefs make it all too apparent that their professed opposition to government aid to the University will exist only for so long as it maintains the policy of denying them pay equal to that of their secular peers.²⁶ The manifest willingness of the appellants to become apostates from their claim under the Establishment Clause thus undermines their fitness to bring it before this Court in an adversary manner.

Under the terms of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, a federal court may act only in "cases" and "controversies". It is clear that "(t)he controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of

²⁶ This point is particularly illustrated by appellant Granfield's brief, which raises the Establishment issue solely as an underpinning of his Free Exercise contentions.

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parties having *adverse* legal interests." (Italics added.) *Aetna Life Ins. Co v. Haworth*, 300 U.S. 227, 240-241 (1937). In *Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education*, 402 U.S. 47 (1971), the Court dismissed an appeal wherein appellants had sought review of a three-judge district court's decision that a portion of a North Carolina anti-busing statute was unconstitutional.

At the hearing both parties argued to the court that the anti-busing law was unconstitutional * * * We are thus confronted with the anomaly that both litigants desire precisely the same result, namely, a holding that the anti-busing statute is constitutional. There is, therefore, no case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III of the Constitution. *Musk-rat v. United States*, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

Id. at 47-48.

The situation with which this Court is confronted is more clouded than that faced by the Supreme Court in the *Charlotte-Mecklenburg* case. Appellants, rather than conceding the lack of dispute, have, in fact, created legal theories leading to the relief they desire. Nevertheless, it is clear that, although appellants purport to raise Establishment issues, they are devoid of a genuine, un-deviating and wholehearted contrariety to the establishment of a religion at the University, insofar as it may be accomplished by a continuation of government aid to the institution. There is, therefore, a want of that concrete adverseness "which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional issues." *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See *Flast v. Cohen*, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). We are impelled to conclude, then, that sound principles of judicial restraint warrant no further consideration of this important constitutional issue.²⁷

²⁷ This holding is not explicitly mandated by the jurisdiction requirements of "case or controversy." However,

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Free Exercise Clause

In setting out his Free Exercise claim, appellant Granfield argues that

public aid to a university the management of which is . . . infused with religious considerations, is suspect under the Establishment Clause . . . [P]ublic aid is impermissible to a university that maintains a policy of keeping a substantial number of its faculty under religious discipline and control. *Any* aid to the University must run afoul of the Establishment Clause so long as this policy is maintained. It follows that this Court can enjoin [the University from] the maintenance of the clerical scale as an invasion of [appellants'] Free Exercise Rights so long as any public funds flow to the University.

To the extent that appellant Granfield's claims rely on our finding an Establishment Clause violation, they must be disallowed for reasons stated earlier.

"[j]usticiability is . . . not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification. Its utilization is the resultant of many subtle pressures . . ." *Poe v. Ullmann*, 367 U.S. 497, 508 (1961). The court noted in *McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel*, 438 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1971), the following:

Although this inquiry has commanded the attention of the Supreme Court both before and since the passage of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, the standards by which cases and controversies are distinguished from claims premature or insufficiently adverse are not susceptible of ready application to a particular case.

To the extent that it can be said that the parties have "adversary" positions, it is on a slight, incremental point—that even assuming the government is not involved in the religious auspices of the university through its funds and contracts, it becomes involved in the religious establishment because of the salary discount for clerical (as opposed to lay Catholic) members of the faculty. That point is without substance in our view, for reasons in large part indicated in our discussion of the internality aspect of the Free Exercise claim (pp. 23-25).

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Both appellants present alternative theories under which they seek relief pursuant to the Free Exercise Clause. Appellant Broderick utilizes the traditional government action theory (equivalent to state action in a fourteenth amendment context) to align the University's program of reduced pay scales for priest-professors with governmental policy. The government action label has been pressed against the conduct of appellee in the recent past. *Spark v. Catholic University*, ——— U.S. App. D.C. ———, 510 F.2d 1277 (1975).²⁸ While certain additional factors relevant to government contacts with the University are presented in this appeal, the *Spark* decision would seem to control as to the claims of government action presented by appellant Broderick. See also *Greenya v. George Washington University*, ——— U.S. App. D.C. ———, 512 F.2d 556 (1975). However, as appellants point out, these holdings are subject to the significantly broader restraints concerning state action in the field of racial discrimination.²⁹ Reasoning from this, they argue that the Religion Clauses are "preferred freedoms", and that the court accordingly should adopt a similar standard in

²⁸ In *Spark*, the Court had before it most of the government action factors which have been presented to this court. The appellant had alleged a first amendment "free expression" claim, and the court refused to find that the state involvement was sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction.

²⁹ It has increasingly become clear that, with respect to racial discrimination, courts are willing to condone less state involvement than would be permitted in other contexts. See, e.g., *Greenya v. George Washington University*, *supra*, ——— U.S. App. D.C. at ———, 512 F.2d at 560; *Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp.*, 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975); *Coleman v. Wagner College* 429 F.2d 1120, 1127 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring); *Powe v. Miles*, 407 F.2d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 1968). Commentators have noted this distinction. See Note, *State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity*, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 656, 661 (1974); Comment, *State Action and the Burger Court*, 60 Va. L. Rev. 840, 850 (1974).

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the context of claims of interference with the free exercise of religion as that existent in cases involving invidious racial distinctions.³⁰ However, as hereafter shown, we find it unnecessary to resolve the issue as framed by appellants.

"[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual . . ." *Sherbert v. Verner*, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). The first amendment's proscription becomes specifically applicable when government attempts by law or other means to affect the freedom of those within a particular religious creed. See, e.g., *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); *Sherbert v. Verner*, *supra*; *Murdock v. Pennsylvania*, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1934). The first amendment becomes relevant to a private institution's attempts to infringe upon the freedom of an individual to practice his religion only when a governmental entity is shown to have become significantly involved in the discrimination practiced by it. See *Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club*, *supra*, at 351, n. 18. Here, however, we have only the case of a particular religion,

³⁰ Such a view was adopted by the court in *Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club*, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975). In *Golden*, it was held that a private yacht club's discriminatory racial and religious membership policies were within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the claim of religious discrimination, the court commented as follows:

We believe, in this context, religious discrimination against the Jewish applicant carries the same stigma of inferiority and badge of opprobrium that is characteristic of racial discrimination. Accordingly, we apply the well developed standards utilized in the racial discrimination setting to both litigants, for the gravity of the harm is exactly the same as to both plaintiffs and there exists no rational basis for distinguishing between them by allowing relief as to one while denying it to the other. (Footnotes omitted.)

Id. at 351.

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through an affiliated educational institution, being charged with discriminating against certain of its own members, by those same members.³¹

We are thus not disposed to adopt the arguments of appellants. The salary scale for priests in a church-related institution clearly appears to be an internal matter of the religious institution affected. In other contexts, courts have traditionally refused to become involved in the resolution of internal religious questions.³²

³¹ Appellants contend that the special pay scale diminishing their salaries because they are clerics represents the same type of sanction upon their free exercise of religion as would a fine levied against them for being Catholic priests.

³² Cf. *Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church*, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); *Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral*, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952); *Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop*, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); *Watson v. Jones*, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); *Kings Garden, Inc. v. F.C.C.*, ——— U.S. App. D.C. ———, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (1974) cert. denied 419 U.S. 996 (1974); *Simpson v. Wells Cement Corp.*, 494 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974).

Justice Brennan, concurring in *Abington School District v. Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 243 (1963) discussed the "internality doctrine":

One line of decisions derives from contests for control of a church property or other internal ecclesiastical disputes. This line has settled the proposition that in order to give effect to the First Amendment's purpose of requiring on the part of all organs of government a strict neutrality toward theological questions, courts should not undertake to decide such questions. These principles were first expounded in the case of *Watson v. Jones*, 13 Wall, 679, which declared that judicial intervention in such a controversy would open up "the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination . . ." 13 Wall, at 733. Courts above all must be neutral, for "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is

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Since we have concluded that the basic dispute is between sectarian authorities and members of the church's own religious orders,³³ the clerical discount here in issue does not involve the sort of restraint which is suspect under the Free Exercise clause, for there is simply no private infringement of religious freedom to impute to the government.³⁴ The appellants' reduced salaries were set by an arm of their own religious organization, for the advancement of its own ecclesiastical objectives. Under these circumstances, a conclusion that appellants' Free Exercise rights were somehow violated by the government would be a paralogism.

Accordingly, we find the Free Exercise claims of appellants to be without merit. The wisdom—or lack there-

committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. 13 Wall at 728.

See also Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1142 (1962); *Comment, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Within Independent Church Bodies*, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 102 (1955); *Comment The Power of Courts Over the Internal Affairs of Religious Groups*, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 322 (1955).

Courts have, on occasion, involved themselves in ecclesiastical affairs where a compelling governmental interest in the regulation of public health, safety and general welfare has demanded court attention. *See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder*, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); *Gillette v. United States*, 401 U.S. 437 (1971); *Braunfield v. Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).

³³ The origin and purpose of the clerical discount is discussed in n. 3. *supra*.

³⁴ "The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion." *Abington School District v. Schempp*, *supra*, at 222-223 (1963).

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of—of the salary policy in question must be resolved within the confines of the religious body involved. We expressly pretermitt consideration of any other grounds raised by appellants, finding them likewise to be meritless.

Affirmed.

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APPENDIX A-1

**Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit dated January 29, 1976.**

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

September Term, 1975

No. 74-1151

Civil 1535-71

DAVID J. K. GRANFIELD, APPELLANT

v.

**THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORPORATION**

No. 74-1152

Civil 1534-71

JOSEPH A. BRODERICK, APPELLANT

v.

**THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,
A DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CORPORATION**

**Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia**

**Before: BAZELON, Chief Judge, LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge
and JUSTICE,* United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Texas**

JUDGMENT

**These causes came on to be heard on the records on
appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia and were argued by counsel. On
consideration of the foregoing, it is**

**ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this Court that the
judgments of the District Court appealed from in these**

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**causes are hereby affirmed, in accordance with the opinion
of this Court filed herein this date.**

**Per Curiam
For the Court**

**/s/ Robert A. Bonner
Robert A. Bonner
Clerk**

Date: January 29, 1976

Opinion for the Court filed by District Judge Justice.

***Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d)**



APPENDIX B

Memorandum of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia dated October 17, 1973 (365 F.Supp. 147 (1973)).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Joseph A. Broderick, Plaintiff, v. Catholic University of America, Defendant (Civil No. 1534-71); and David J. K. Granfield, Plaintiff, v. Catholic University of America, Defendant (Civil No. 1535-71).

MEMORANDUM

GASCH, *District Judge*.

This is a consolidated civil action brought by two priests against the Catholic University of America where they are both employed as professors in the Columbus School of Law. The central issue revolves around the policy of the defendant University in paying clerical members of their faculty a lesser salary than that of lay faculty. Based upon numerous theories of law, each plaintiff seeks, essentially, to have the Court end this "clerical discount" as applied to them. Before reaching the plaintiffs' factual and legal claims, the Court will set forth the factual background in which this controversy arose.

I. Factual Background.

The Catholic University of America until recently was a pontifical university functioning under the direction of the Holy See.¹ However, between 1967-1970 all but

¹ Prior to 1968, the selection of the University president was subject to the approval of the Vatican and all members of the Board of Trustees were members of the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Transcript at 108-112 (all references to the trial transcript will hereinafter be denoted by a capital T).

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three schools of the defendant University have become independent of the Holy See.² Thus, but for a few remaining vestiges of its past governance by the Catholic hierarchy,³ the Catholic University functions essentially as most other American institutions of higher education. Nevertheless, one of the remaining practices is the utilization of a "clerical scale" which in application allows those members of the faculty who are clergy or religious a lower salary than lay faculty members. At the present time there are only two members of the law school faculty who are clerics and to whom this "scale" is applicable. These two faculty members, Father Joseph Broderick and Father David J. K. Granfield, are the plaintiffs in this case. Both plaintiffs have received tenure.

It appears clear from the testimony and exhibits that the elimination of parity has been an issue which has received varying degrees of consideration over the years. As early as 1945, at a meeting of the executive committee of defendant's Board of Trustees, a revised faculty scale was proposed which would, within four years and when fully implemented, put clerical and religious members of defendant's faculty on a basis of salary parity with lay members of its faculty. The revised scale was adopted and put into effect for lay members of the faculty, but not for clerical and religious members.⁴ This pattern of

² The three schools still remaining under pontifical direction are the schools of Theology, Philosophy, and Canon Law. Plaintiff Broderick's Proposed Findings of Fact number 29.

³ One half of the Board of Trustees are clerics, of which five are Cardinals. There are in addition other strong ties to the Roman Catholic Church within the structure of the University but these are extraneous for the most part to the question at issue.

⁴ Exhibit 4d — Minutes of the Board of Trustees, January 12, 1945. In addition, the executive committee of the Board of

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indecision and movement in regard to parity resulted in several statements and announcements, and resolutions over the years which are critical to plaintiffs' claims in this case.

First, on February 8, 1968, the defendant's Academic Senate⁵ adopted a resolution that the Academic Senate request defendant's Board of Trustees to adopt a policy of parity of salaries between clerical and religious members and lay members of defendant's faculty and to "implement this policy *without delay*."⁶ (Emphasis added).

Subsequently, on September 12, 1968, Mr. Hickey of the Finance Committee of the Board of Trustees reported that his committee "*avored* putting the salaries of clerical members of the faculty on a parity with lay members."⁷

Trustees considered a petition that parity be extended for the clerical and religious faculty in January of 1965 with only an adoption of a 20% increase for the clerics and religious faculty resulting. Exhibit 4f — Minutes of the Board of Trustees, April 28, 1965. Again in 1966 a committee was appointed to study a request for salary increases for the priest-professors of up to 70% of parity. Exhibit 4h — Minutes of the Board of Trustees, November 13, 1966.

⁵ The Academic Senate is a body composed of members of the administration, including the president, vice-president, and deans in addition to the representatives chosen by the faculty of the various schools and departments. The Senate shares with the president the responsibility for the *academic* governance of the University. T at 26-27. It is significant that the direction and management of affairs of the University are controlled by the Board of Trustees, Exhibit 12, Documents of the Catholic University of America at 2.

⁶ Exhibit 5a, Minutes of the Academic Senate, February 8, 1968.

⁷ Exhibit 41, Minutes of the Board of Trustees, September 12, 1968.

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(Emphasis added). Similarly, on December 6-7, 1968, the Finance Committee and the Academic Affairs Committee both wished

to go on record as still considering the *desired goal* (emphasis added) in faculty salaries to be the A level of the AAUP [American Association of University Professors] scale—not *Plan A*—including, eventually, placing the salaries of clerical members of the faculty on a parity with lay teachers.

The Committees, however, faced the straitened 1969-70 financial situation. Its realities make it impossible to implement Plan B as submitted by the Academic Senate.⁸

The Committees at this meeting recommended that the present salary scale be kept, and the sums available be used for new personnel and merit increments for members of the faculty. These recommendations were approved.⁹

Following this December 6-7, 1968, meeting of the Board of Trustees, there were many interpretations of exactly what the Board of Trustees had accepted as a matter of policy. The *Administrative Bulletin* of December 16, 1968, a publication emanating from the Office of the Provost and a general source of information to the University community, reported that

after consideration of faculty salary proposals presented at a previous meeting, the Board (1) affirmed acceptance *as a goal* of the A-level standard of the American Association of University Professors and elimination of the present disparity

⁸ Exhibit 4m, Minutes of the Board of Trustees, December 6-7, 1968.

⁹ *Id.*

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between scales for clerical and religious and lay members of the faculty; (2) directed that normal salary increments under the present scale should be continued during 1969-70; and (3) directed that after such increments, funds remaining from increased tuition income should be used for salaries of new administrative and faculty personnel and for merit increments to present members of the faculty.¹⁰ (Emphasis added).

This interpretation of the Board of Trustees' action appears to follow accurately the minutes of the Board of Trustees December 6-7, 1968, meeting. However, Acting President Nivard Scheel at a December 12, 1968, meeting of the Academic Senate reported that the Board of Trustees, with respect to faculty salaries,

approved a recommendation submitted jointly by its Committees on Academic Affairs that the AAUP "A" scale, and parity of clerical and lay salaries be achieved *as soon as possible*. However, because of limited revenues, "Plan B" cannot be achieved next year. Income from the rise in tuition will therefore be used to a) maintain present salary scale, b) permit recruitment of new administrative and faculty personnel, and c) allow for merit increases to selected members of the faculty.¹¹

From the foregoing facts plaintiffs argue that the University community and even the administration believed that "defendant's board of trustees had accepted the principle of parity of salaries" although admittedly there were questions with respect to the "speed of imple-

¹⁰ Exhibit 6a, *Administrative Bulletin*, December 16, 1968.

¹¹ Exhibit 5b, Minutes of the Academic Senate, December 12, 1968.

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mentation of the *goal* which the administration announced had been adopted."¹² (Emphasis added). In further support of this argument, plaintiffs both point out the meeting of President Walton with the priest-faculty members at Curley Hall. At this meeting, as reported to the Board of Trustees by President Walton, the priest-professors were told by President Walton that

the University *aims* to raise their salaries to parity: to 75% of parity in 1971-72; 85% in 1972-73; and 100% in 1973-74. To do this, [President Walton] said, will increase the University's financial problems by some \$300,000 as against the \$80,000 deficit Curley Hall dining hall shows annually.¹³ (Emphasis added).

II. Promissory Estoppel.

Within this factual context, the strongest of both plaintiffs' arguments appears to be that the defendant, on the grounds of promissory estoppel, should be estopped from denying that both plaintiffs had been removed from the clerical scale due to representations made by the defendant through its administrators and Board of Trustees and justifiably and detrimentally relied upon by plaintiffs. Since plaintiff Broderick has an additional

¹² Proposed Findings of Fact of Plaintiff Broderick, numbers 83, 84. Additionally, with respect to the implementation of parity, Provost Nuesse, in rejecting Father Broderick's request for a full salary during his sabbatical leave in 1969-70, stated:

... I *hope* that the dual scale of salaries can be eliminated within the next year or two so that this kind of problem will not recur. (Emphasis added).

Exhibit 10bb, Letter of Provost Nuesse to Acting Dean Rohner, June 16, 1969.

¹³ Exhibit 4n, Minutes of the Board of Trustees, June 6, 1970.

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basis for his promissory estoppel arguments, his contentions will be dealt with after those of Father Granfield.

A. Father Granfield.

Father Granfield is a professor of law at defendant Columbus School of Law where he has been on the faculty since 1960.¹⁴ As noted previously, Father Granfield is paid on the "clerical scale" which results in his salary being approximately 50 percent of the median salary paid to other full professors at the Law School.¹⁵

Father Granfield's promissory estoppel argument is based upon the representations made by the administration, especially that of Acting President Nivard Scheel that parity would be achieved "as soon as possible," and the actions and announcements of the Board of Trustees.¹⁶

The Restatement of Contracts, § 90, most succinctly sets forth the elements of promissory estoppel.

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.¹⁷

¹⁴ Father Granfield graduated from Harvard University Law School in 1947 and has published a casebook and numerous legal articles.

¹⁵ T at 342.

¹⁶ See *supra*, note 11, and notes 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 and accompanying text.

¹⁷ The Restatement Second of Contracts (Tent. Draft #2) sets out Section 90 as follows:

A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbear-

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The Court considers the statements issued by the University as to parity were often confusing and possibly contradictory. Nevertheless, upon careful review of these pronouncements, this Court cannot find that Father Granfield could have justifiably relied upon these statements. Comment b of § 90 of the Restatement addresses this point by noting:

The promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on the reasonableness of the promisee's reliance, on its definite and substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to which evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent, and channeling functions of form are met by the commercial setting or otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust enrichment are relevant.¹⁸

In the factual setting previously set forth, it is clear that Father Granfield's reliance in the context of promissory estoppel on amorphous statements that included such wording as "desired goal",¹⁹ "as a goal",²⁰ and "as

ance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.

See generally 1 Williston, Contracts § § 139-140 (3d ed. 1957). *Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mowry*, 96 U.S. 544 (1877).

¹⁸ See *Curtiss Candy Co. v. Silberman*, 45 F.2d 451, 453 (6th Cir. 1930). 1 Williston, Contracts § 140 (3d ed. 1957).

¹⁹ See *supra*, note 8 and accompanying text.

²⁰ See *supra*, note 10 and accompanying text.

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soon as possible",²¹ was not justified. The most definite statement emanated from President Walton where he set forth the specific intentions of the University.²² Again, however, President Walton spoke only of intentions and in light of the stance of the Board of Trustees and the past precatory working of all statements concerning parity, this Court concludes that Father Granfield's promissory estoppel claim must fail when viewed under the scrutiny of all the surrounding circumstances.²³

B. Father Broderick.

Father Joseph Broderick, a priest in the Dominican Order of Preachers, is a tenured professor of law and, like Father Granfield, is a well-respected member of the Law School faculty.²⁴ Although Father Broderick bases his promissory estoppel claim on many of the same grounds as Father Granfield, Father Broderick has an additional basis which involves a very difficult and, in a factual sense, very different question. To the extent that Father Broderick's promissory estoppel claims are

²¹ See *supra*, note 11 and accompanying text.

²² See note 13, *supra*, and accompanying text.

²³ Moreover, this Court fails to find any real reliance by Father Granfield. The fact that plaintiff Granfield was "approached" by Professor Katz of the Boston College of Law does not illustrate to this Court from the information presented that there was either a preliminary offer for Father Granfield to take employment elsewhere or that Father Granfield did not leave Catholic University because of his reliance on a "promise" of parity from defendant. Cf. *Goodman v. Dicker*, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948). see *Dickerson v. Colgrove*, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879).

²⁴ Father Broderick received his A.B. degree from Princeton University and an LL.B. degree from Harvard University. After ordination, Father Broderick received an S.J.D. degree from Harvard and a doctoral degree from Oxford University.

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grounded on the same principles as those of Father Granfield, they must be rejected on the findings and conclusions previously outlined. In regard to Father Broderick's additional claim the facts are as follows.

Between January 25 and April 24, 1970, Father Broderick and Clinton Bamberger, Dean of the Law School, corresponded with one another concerning plaintiff Broderick's request for an increased salary. It is evident that Father Broderick was contemplating resignation if his *salary* was not increased for the school year 1970-71.²⁵ In response to Father Broderick's request for a salary increase, Dean Bamberger wrote:

\$11,000 is the maximum paid to University clerics under University policy. If I was not bound by that policy I would have recommended for you a salary of \$21,500. That is the step at which you would be in the scale which I constructed to give me some rough guidance.²⁶

The critical letter upon which Father Broderick bases his promissory estoppel and contract claims is the letter of April 24, 1970, from Dean Bamberger to Father Broderick. This letter reads in relevant part:

. . . I have just firmed up your salary for next year and want to get the news to you as soon as possible.

²⁵ Exhibit 10d, Letter of Father Broderick to Dean Bamberger, January 25, 1970. In this letter Father Broderick informed Dean Bamberger:

I will not submit a resignation herewith. But I will promise you an immediate response when I receive final word from you as to what my *salary* for 1970-71 is finally determined to be (emphasis added).

²⁶ Exhibit 10G, Letter from Dean Bamberger to Father Broderick, January 29, 1970.

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The salary for next year for you will be \$20,100 —with no clerical discount.²⁷ (Emphasis added).

Plaintiff Broderick's argument is that he returned to Catholic University to teach in reliance upon this salary increase which he interpreted as an agreement to grant parity by defendant.²⁸ Father Broderick has argued that the April 24, 1970 letter which spoke of \$20,100 with "no clerical discount" is subject to two interpretations and he interpreted it as a grant of parity. However, it is the opinion of this Court in view of the surrounding circumstances and the past history of the parity issue at the defendant University, that the April 24 letter was referring only to a salary increase, not a change of status removing Father Broderick from the clerical scale.

In addition, the Court finds that Father Broderick could not have justifiably relied²⁹ on this letter as a basis for believing he had been granted parity. Father Broderick was informed on January 29, 1970, that his salary would be \$21,500, not \$20,100 if he was to be removed from the "clerical scale." Furthermore, the Provost, Dr. Nuesse, has testified that it was his view that only an exception had been granted to Father Broderick and not his placement on the lay scale.³⁰ This

²⁷ Exhibit 10a, Letter from Dean Bamberger to Father Broderick, April 24, 1970.

²⁸ T at 73. Without deciding the question whether Dean Bamberger or Provost Nuesse had the power to grant Father Broderick's request to be removed from the clerical scale, it appears to the Court that the Dean traditionally acted as the representative of the faculty member in contract negotiations not as the spokesman for the defendant's view. Moreover, Dr. Nuesse testified that even he did not have the authority to remove a priest-professor from the clerical scale. T at 538-39.

²⁹ See *supra*, note 18 and accompanying text.

³⁰ T at 269, 524-525.

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appears to be the correct interpretation of the April 24 letter. Thus, the language "no clerical discount," as noted previously, applied only to plaintiff Broderick's salary, not his status. In his letter to Dean Bamberger of January 25, 1970, it is also noteworthy that Father Broderick was waiting for final word "as to what my salary for 1970-71" will be,³¹ not whether he would be placed on the lay scale. The Court concludes, therefore, that Father Broderick's promissory estoppel claim must be rejected for the reasons stated.

II. Contract.

The contract claims of each plaintiff are based on essentially the same fact patterns as the promissory estoppel arguments. However, it is alleged that the breach of the contract to grant parity, which arose from all the statements of the administration and the Board of Trustees, occurred on December 12, 1970, when the Board of Trustees passed a resolution basically reaffirming the principle of the clerical scale.³²

Without reviewing each pronouncement and each letter once more, it is the holding of the Court that no contract to grant parity ever arose between plaintiffs and defendant. Due to the ambiguous nature of the announcements, resolutions, and letters, it can only be held that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties and no real agreement demonstrating offer and acceptance ever in fact existed. 1 Williston on Contracts § § 17-21 (3d ed. 1957); *Zell v. American Seating Co.*, 138 F.2d

³¹ See *supra*, note 25.

³² This resolution, Exhibit 4p, December 14, 1970, was the subject of much controversy due to its ambiguous wording but was finally interpreted by a special Ad Hoc Committee of the Academic Senate to be a repudiation of parity.

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641, 646 (2d Cir. 1943). Moreover, from the facts before the Court it is clear that there was only a "mere expression of intention" on the part of the defendant that did not amount to an offer that could in any manner be accepted by plaintiffs. 1 Williston on Contracts § 26 (3d ed. 1957). In the language of Justice Holmes:

On the face of it, it does not import a legally binding promise, but rather a hopeful encouragement, sounding only in prophecy.

Hall v. First National Bank of Chelsea, 173 Mass. 16, 53 N.E. 154, 155 (1899).

III. Constitutional Claims.

Both plaintiffs assert numerous constitutional claims asserting a violation of the First and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. Essentially, plaintiffs argue that due to the United States Government's involvement in the defendant, through tuition grants, research and instruction grants, Congressional chartering, and defendant's tax exemption as an educational institution, there is sufficient governmental involvement ("state action") to bring into play the clauses of the Bill of Rights which limit the impingement by governmental action upon individual rights. The Court does not agree.

In regard to the amount of federal funds flowing to the University, it is clear that without further direct involvement in the affairs of the defendant, no governmental action exists. In the case of *Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University*, 387 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the District Court was met with very similar claims of violations of constitutional rights by Columbia University's disciplinary proceedings against students involved in building depredations. Although the case addressed

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principally the use of state funds³³ by Columbia University, the language is clearly analogous to the issue presented to this Court. In deciding this point, the *Grossner* Court stated:

A more fundamental point against plaintiffs is that receipt of money from the State is not, without a good deal more, enough to make the recipient an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Otherwise, all kinds of contractors and enterprises, increasingly dependent upon government business for much larger proportions of income than those here in question, would find themselves charged with "state action" in the performance of all kinds of functions we still consider and treat as essentially "private" for all presently relevant purposes. See *Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital*, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), *cert. denied*, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).

287 F. Supp. at 547-48.

Grossner, additionally, noted that the test of *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961), was how far the state "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence . . . that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." 365 U.S. at 725.

³³ In 1966, \$49,500,000 out of the \$117,500,000 income of Columbia University came from public funds. Similarly, in 1967, \$59,700,000 of a total of \$134,300,000 came from public funds. In our case the defendant in the fiscal year ending 1968 received 24.9 percent of all its income from the Federal Government. In the fiscal year of 1970 defendant received 25.8 percent of its income from the United States Government and 24.6 percent in fiscal 1971.

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It is apparent to this Court that the Federal Government has in no substantial respect insinuated itself into any form of interdependence with Catholic University. Although money and tax considerations are given to defendant, this is a far cry from any influence on policy or decision-making or the encouragement of any specific policy. Therefore, as to whether there is "governmental action" due to the influx of Federal funds, the Court finds there is not.

The plaintiffs' arguments in relation to tax exemptions and government chartering and government action are equally without merit. The Sixth Circuit recently was confronted with a similar issue in *Blackburn v. Fisk University*, 443 F.2d 121 (1971). The plaintiffs were students at the University and were suspended without a hearing. Fisk University is a privately endowed university under a charter granted by the State of Tennessee and exempt from state and local taxes. The court, in rejecting plaintiffs' allegation that university action was tantamount to "state action," held:

State involvement sufficient to transform a "private" university into a "State" university requires more than merely chartering the university, *Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 . . . , providing financial aid in the form of public funds, *Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia University*, 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y.); or granting of tax exemptions, *Brown v. Mitchell*, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir.).

443 F.2d at 123.

Thus, plaintiffs' allegations of "governmental action" must be rejected. Since there is no governmental action, the constitutional claims of plaintiffs need not be specifically discussed.

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In conclusion, all other claims of plaintiffs have been found to be without sufficient substance to warrant detailed analysis. Although the Court has respect and sympathy for the sincerity and depth of plaintiffs' feelings regarding parity, we are unable to find a legal basis for ruling that plaintiffs are entitled to parity of salaries on the facts present under the circumstances of this case.

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APPENDIX B-1

Order that judgment be entered dated October 18, 1973,
of the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia.

Filed
October 23, 1973
James F. Davey, Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOSEPH A. BRODERICK,)	
<i>Plaintiff,</i>)	
v.)	Civil Action
)	No. 1534-71
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,)	
<i>Defendant.</i>)	
)	
DAVID J. K. GRANFIELD,)	
<i>Plaintiff,</i>)	
v.)	
)	Civil Action
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,)	No. 1535-71
<i>Defendant.</i>)	

ORDER

Upon consideration of the entire record and in accordance with the findings of the Court set forth in the Memorandum filed on the 17th day of October, 1973, it is by the Court this 18th day of October, 1973,

ORDERED that judgment in the above-titled actions be entered for the defendant Catholic University of America.

/s/ Oliver Gasch
Judge

Supreme Court, U. S.

FILED

JUL 27 1976

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1975

No. 75 - 1647

DAVID J. K. GRANFIELD,

Petitioner,

v.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

**REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
DAVID K. GRANFIELD**

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1. May a publicly-funded church-related institution of higher education shield its constitutionally suspect conduct by invoking the free exercise rights of a religious organization?

Six years ago the District Court in DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970), said

" . . . private conduct which is heavily subsidized by the state may be viewed as state action and subjected to the same standards of impartiality which we demand of government. . . .
Applying these standards to parochial

schools might well restrict their ability to discriminate in admissions policies, . . . and in hiring and firing teachers At some point the school becomes 'public' for more purposes than the Church could wish. At that point, the Church may justifiably feel that its victory on the Establishment Clause has meant abandonment of the Free Exercise Clause." 316 F. Supp. at 121-22 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis added).

The same thought was expressed by Chief Judge Hastie in his dissent in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 at 52 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Justice Brennan, in concurring in Lemon and dissenting in Tilton, ^{1/} also focused on this proposition. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 651-52 (1971). And Justice Douglas in his dissent in Tilton stated "Once these schools become federally funded they become bound by federal standards. . ." 403 U.S. at 693-94.

Respondent rejects this equation. In its Brief in Opposition respondent has boldly asserted what was merely implied in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. We are told that Catholic University has "its own constitutional right to freedom from government interference." Respondent's Brief at 11. Respondent asserts that "acceptance of petitioner's argument would lead to an interference with the

^{1/} Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)

University's exercise of . . . [its "own right to religious freedom"]." Respondent's Brief at 17. See also respondent's Brief at 15. This free exercise right, according to respondent, precludes judicial scrutiny of actions taken by the university, no matter how constitutionally offensive, in spite of the very substantial public funds drawn by the university from the federal treasury.

Respondent simply ignores the paradox of its position. Only a religious organization can enjoy the special free exercise rights of an organized church recognized in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952). See also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 44 U.S.L.W. 4927 (1976). And a religious organization entitled to Kedroff-type free exercise rights necessarily is ineligible for public aid -- such aid, as aid to an organized church, would violate the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, respondent wants to straddle this chasm.

Can respondent have its cake and eat it too? Can it draw federal funds but be immunized from the duties and responsibilities that normally accompany such funds? The issue is plainly of such fundamental importance that the writ should be granted.

2. The Establishment Clause plays a crucial part in determining whether Respondent's actions are attributable to the Federal Government.

Respondent seeks to avoid the impact of the imperatives of the Establishment Clause on this case. Respondent's arguments are couched in traditional state action terms as if this was just another routine 14th amendment-based case arising in a university context. The Establishment Clause is put to one side on the grounds that petitioner has not sought, as relief, a cut-off of all public funds to respondent. But the fact that this drastic relief was not sought against the university by petitioner does not render the Establishment Clause irrelevant. On the contrary, the Establishment Clause plays a pivotal role in determining the nature and quantum of governmental ties necessary for particular conduct of respondent to be attributable to the Federal Government.

Plainly, wherever public funds are granted to church-related institutions, the danger of exceeding the permissible perimeters of the Establishment Clause exists. Where, as here, a particular course of conduct engaged in by a publicly-funded church-related institution acts to jeopardize the legitimacy of the entire flow of public funds to the institution by markedly increasing the religious character of

that institution, vindication of the Establishment Clause requires on the part of the courts a readiness to examine either the institution's public funding as a whole, or in particular the course of conduct which markedly increases the institution's religious character. Where that course of conduct violates the constitutional rights of an individual, the fact that it also acts to jeopardize the legitimacy, under the Establishment Clause, of the institution's public funding should serve to greatly reduce the immediacy of the nexus required, and the general level of governmental participation required, for a holding that the challenged conduct constitutes governmental action.

This approach does little more than give effect in a new context to the primary effect test set out in Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973). Maintenance of the clerical scale, inevitably tends to demonstrate that respondent is "an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission."^{2/} For the logic of

^{2/} Indeed, in light of the direct flow of federal funds paid to respondent into faculty salaries, maintenance of the clerical scale also offends the second and alternative element in the Hunt v. McNair primary effect test as the federal monies fund a "specifically religious activity."

respondent's position is that petitioners, as priests, are and must be subject to the discipline of the church. See respondent's Brief at 18. Chief Justice Burger, rejecting state aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, states:

"We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of precollege education.

* * *

. . . [W]hat has been recounted suggests the potential if not actual hazards of this form of state aid. The teacher is employed by a religious organization, subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities, and works in a system dedicated to rearing children in a particular faith." 403 U.S. at 617-618.

In effect, respondent in its Brief argues (a) that petitioner Granfield is employed by a religious organization, and (b) that he is subject to the direction and discipline of religious authorities. Surely, if this is so, the pervasiveness of religion necessarily is so high at respondent as to jeopardize the legitimacy of public funding to the institution. And this fact should serve, in this case, to reduce the

hurdles normally placed in the path of a litigant seeking to challenge the constitutionality of conduct of a purportedly private institution.

What part the Establishment Clause is to play in determining whether particular conduct of a publicly-funded church-related institution of higher education is attributable to the Federal Government is an issue of fundamental importance. The writ should be granted to resolve this issue. 3/

3. May a publicly-funded institution, because of a nominal church tie, violate with impunity the free exercise rights of individuals within its ambit of governance?
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Respondent seeks to defeat petitioner Granfield's free exercise claim by insisting that the clerical scale "is made by priests of the same religion." Respondent's Brief at 16. Further, respondent asserts that when petitioners voluntarily

- 3/ Respondent in its Brief at 16, footnote 16, asserts that petitioners have no standing as taxpayers to challenge the expenditure of federal funds under the Establishment Clause, since petitioners pay no federal income tax. In fact, petitioner Granfield has paid both Federal and Maryland income tax in the years 1973, 1974 and 1975, and has filed estimated quarterly returns with the Federal Internal Revenue Service for 1976. He clearly would have standing as a taxpayer-plaintiff to seek a total cut-off of federal funds to respondent.

became priests, they were well aware that they might be "subjected by their church" to certain restraints. Finally, respondent asserts that petitioners "as priests of religious orders, came to Catholic University with the approval of the Superiors of their orders, who control their assignments as priests and who were fully aware of the clerical salary policy." Respondent's Brief at 18.

This is misleading. The clerical scale is not imposed by priests, nor by a church, nor by petitioner's religious Superiors. It is imposed and maintained by a publicly-funded university. Indeed, the Court of Appeals specifically recognized that an "institutional declericalization" had taken place at respondent, and observed that:

During 1967-70 the University, which once functioned under the direction of the Roman Catholic Church, severed many of its ties with the Church. Only three schools now have "pontifical status" -- those being the schools of Theology, Philosophy, and Canon law. In 1969, a layman became president of the University. In addition, the student body and faculty, which were once nearly exclusively Catholic, gained significantly in non-Catholic percentage. Appendix A to Granfield's Petition at A-4, footnote 5.

This nominally Catholic but functionally secular institution is the agency which taxes petitioner

Granfield's free exercise of his religion. Imposition of the clerical scale on petitioner Granfield is a coercive intermeddling with his religious rights. The writ should be granted to settle whether a publicly-funded institution can, because of a nominal church tie, violate with impunity the free exercise rights of individuals within its ambit of governance.

Respectfully submitted,

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